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Abstract
An ambitious goal for artificial intelligence is to create agents that behave ethically:
The capacity to abide by human moral norms would greatly expand the context
in which autonomous agents could be practically and safely deployed. While
ethical agents could be trained through reinforcement, by rewarding correct behav-
ior under a specific moral theory (e.g. utilitarianism), there remains widespread
disagreement (both societally and among moral philosophers) about the nature of
morality and what ethical theory (if any) is objectively correct. Acknowledging
such disagreement, recent work in moral philosophy proposes that ethical behavior
requires acting under moral uncertainty, i.e. to take into account when acting
that one’s credence is split across several plausible ethical theories. Inspired by
such work, this paper proposes a formalism that translates such insights to the
field of reinforcement learning. Demonstrating the formalism’s potential, we then
train agents in simple environments to act under moral uncertainty, highlighting
how such uncertainty can help curb extreme behavior from commitment to single
theories. The overall aim is to draw productive connections from the fields of
moral philosophy and machine ethics to that of machine learning, to inspire further
research by highlighting a spectrum of machine learning research questions relevant
to training ethically capable reinforcement learning agents.
1 Introduction
Progress in reinforcement learning (RL) has enabled superhuman performance in increasingly
complex benchmark tasks (e.g. Go [1] and Starcraft [2]). While such accomplishments are significant,
much less progress has been made in applying RL to unstructured environments in the real world
(e.g. robots that interact with humans in homes). A significant challenge is that in such real-world
environments, solutions are much more complexly constrained than in typical benchmarks. For
example, there are many unacceptable ways for a robotic vacuum to clean a room, e.g. by breaking a
vase, or by harming a house cat. In particular, robots may have affordances in such environments with
ethical implications, i.e. they may be able to harm or help others, and break or abide by human social
and ethical norms (such as the golden rule, or legal codes). The design of algorithms that embody
ethical theories has been pursued by the machine ethics research community [3–5], and ideas from
that community could provide reward functions encoding moral theories that could be maximized by
RL to create ethical agents.
While research into implementing specific ethical theories is progressing, a fundamental uncertainty
remains: which ethical theory should an intelligent agent follow? In this work, we consider the
possibility that this question cannot be given a definite answer, and thus that an RL agent should act
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with uncertainty as to which theory to follow. There are many different theories of ethics within
moral philosophy (such as utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics), no consensus within moral
philosophy as to which theory is correct, and divergent moral and ethical views across individuals
in society. As a result, if an RL agent is to act as ethically as possible, it is reasonable that it
should exhibit moral uncertainty. In this work, we adapt philosophical work on moral (or normative)
uncertainty [6, 7] to propose a similarly-inspired framework for RL.
In the case where ethical reward functions are comparable on a shared cardinal scale, a compos-
ite reward function (composed by adding together individual reward functions weighted by their
credence) can be optimized in a straightforward way. However, it is often not clear how to create
such a shared reward scale between theories. We propose several possible solutions to this problem
(which is related to non-dominance in multi-objective optimization), motivated by the principle of
proportional say, that an ethical theory should have influence over outcomes proportional to its
credence, irrespective of the scale of its rewards. These techniques may also prove valuable in RL
more generally, wherein complex reward functions are often constructed from weighted sums of
important aspects of performance, and where fixed trade-off weights are difficult to a priori assign
and balance.
We incrementally introduce the complications of applying moral uncertainty to RL using grid-world
environments based on moral dilemmas (i.e. trolley problems [8]) common in moral philosophy,
highlighting how moral uncertainty can lead to realizing intuitively reasonable trade-offs between
ethical theories. Each of the methods introduced here to deal with incomparable reward functions
has its relative disadvantages; some disadvantages may represent fundamental trade-offs resulting
from impossibility results in social choice theory, but we also hope by introducing this problem that
researchers in multi-objective optimization and multi-agent RL may further improve on our initial
algorithms. A final motivation for our work is to introduce a productive bridge between the fields
of RL, machine ethics, and moral philosophy, in hopes of grounding out philosophical ideas in a
concrete and testable way, similarly as to how AI as a whole offers grounding for philosophical
speculations about intelligence; in other words, we hope this work is a productive contribution to the
growing field of computational philosophy [9, 10].
2 Philosophical Background
2.1 Common Ethical Theories
This paper’s methods and experiments will use specific examples to illustrate trade-offs and conflicts
between ethical theories. This section briefly introduces such theories to provide context. One broad
class of ethical theories are utilitarian, and claim that what is ethical is what maximizes happiness
or well-being for the most. For example, a utilitarian might tell a lie in order to save a person’s
life. Another broad class of ethical theories are deontological and can loosely be characterized as
theories that judge the morality of an action by whether it abides by a set of rules. Given the rule
“lying is wrong,” a deontologist might commit to telling the truth, even if a person might lose their
life as a consequence. Another common conflict between utilitarianism and deontology (that we
leverage in our experiments) is that causing harm (e.g. punching a stranger) under many deontologic
theories is worse than failing to prevent harm (e.g. not stopping a stranger from punching an innocent
victim), while causing and failing to prevent harm are often considered to be equally wrong under
utilitarianism.
Many varieties of both utilitarianism (e.g. hedonistic vs preference utilitarianism, actual vs expected
utilitarianism, etc. [11]) and deontology (e.g. Kantian ethics [12], doctrine of double effect [13],
etc.) exist, as well as ethical theories that do not fit either of these categories (e.g. virtue ethics [14],
variants of consequentialism other than utilitarianism [11], and divine command theory [15]). While
many (possibly all) of these additional theories would need to be implemented in a real-world morally
uncertain agent, only the high level distinction between utilitarianism and deontology is necessary to
understand nearly all of the illustrative examples in this work. We introduce further such distinctions
only as needed.
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2.2 Moral Uncertainty in Philosophy
The first significant philosophical work on moral uncertainty, Lockhart [7], was published in the
year 2000, surprisingly recently given the simplicity and importance of the idea, within such a
prominent and long-standing field (philosophy). Lockhart proposes that the preferences of moral
theories be normalized so as to equalize their minimum and maximum preferences prior to making a
decision, a system analogous to range voting [16]. Similarly, Bostrom [17] proposes a “parliamentary
model” for moral uncertainty, but does not specify the exact voting system that ought to be used.
More recently, MacAskill [6] gives an extensive account of moral uncertainty which explores how to
handle the comparability of moral theories (whether the preferences of such theories can be expressed
in comparable units) and how to combine preferences across ordinal and cardinal theories (whether a
given theory’s preferences assign a specific score to various options, or simply order them from best
to worst). To solve such challenges, MacAskill [6] proposes Borda counts [18] as a way to produce
cardinal values for ordinal theories, as well as variance voting for combining incompatible cardinal
theories. In variance voting, the preferences of theories are normalized to have a mean of 0 and a
variance of 1 prior to being aggregated into a final decision.
Crucially, proposals in moral philosophy typically do not explicitly consider the sequential nature of
decision making. In MacAskill’s framework, for example, theories have preferences over “options,”
which correspond to possible worlds. In contrast, in reinforcement learning, an agent cannot directly
bring about possible worlds but rather takes (often very granular) actions, which have long term
effects both in the consequences that they bring about and in how they shape the future ethically-
charged decision situations an agent may encounter in the future. That is, while “save a person’s
life” may be a valid option that can be studied in philosophical frameworks, in RL saving a life may
unfold over hundreds of individual actions such as “rotate the 5th joint of the robot arm 3 degrees
clockwise.” Aside from providing concrete implementations of moral uncertainty, bridging the gap
between options and actions is one of the key contributions of this work.
3 Methods
As in MacAskill [6], we assume the primary relevant feature of an ethical theory is its preference
ordering over actions and their immediate outcomes across different states of the world, which we
call its choice-worthiness function W , and which is assumed to be complete (i.e. is defined for all
possible state-action pairs). Any preference ordering which satisfies the von Neumann–Morgenstern
(VNM) axioms for rationality can be represented as a cardinal utility function [19], where all affine
transformations of said utility function represent the same preference ordering. As such, we will limit
ourselves to considering cases where W is cardinal.
It may be objected that some ethical theories (e.g. variants of deontology such as the categorical
imperative [12]) appear to be better represented ordinally rather than cardinally. MacAskill [6]
proposes that the Borda count [18] is a principled way of obtaining a cardinal utility function from a
purely ordinal theory under circumstances of moral uncertainty. Thus, for simplicity and because
it is often possible to convert ordinal theories to a cardinal representation, this work focuses on
cardinal utility functions only. However, handling these seemingly ordinal theories more directly is
an interesting avenue for future work, for which work on ordinal RL [20, 21] could serve as a starting
point. It has also been argued that many seemingly ordinal theories are in fact better represented
lexicographically [6] (a combination of ordinal and cardinal representation), suggesting lexicographic
RL [22] as an alternative starting point.
We assume a modified version of the standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework [23], in
which an agent can be in any of a number of states s and take an action a (the action space is assumed
to be discrete) to end up in a next state s′. The key difference with the standard MDP framework
is the absence of a reward function R(s, a, s′) for transitioning from state s to s′ using action a.
Rather, the cardinal choice-worthiness function Wi(s, a, s′) can be seen as analogous to a standard
reward function for theory i. Indeed, from the point of view of any given theory, the optimal policy is
that which maximizes the (possibly discounted) sum of choice-worthiness across time. The crucial
distinction is that a morally uncertain agent should attempt to find an ideal compromise between
maximizing multiple choice-worthiness functions rather than maximizing a single reward function.
It is useful to define the function Qi(s, a), which represents the expected and possibly discounted
sum of future choice-worthiness for theory i starting from taking action a at state s, with all future
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actions given by the current policy, pi, which in our work will be the compromise policy reached by
aggregating the preferences of the theories. In other words,
Qi(s, a) = E
[
N∑
k=0
di(k)Wi(st+k, at+k, st+k+1)|st = s, at = a, pi
]
, (1)
where N is the number of steps in an episode (possibly∞) and di(k) is a discount function, most
commonly exponential discounting (di(k) = γki for γi ∈ [0, 1]). Other discounting frameworks such
as hyperbolic discounting [24] or an average reward framework [25] could be used, and may have
different ethical interpretations (i.e. how much moral priority the present has over the future [26–28]),
so that different discount functions may need to be used for each theory. All the experiments in
this work use short, episodic environments, allowing us to set di(s) = 1 (i.e. undiscounted rewards)
across all of them for simplicity.
Each theory has a level of credence Ci, which represents the degree of belief that the agent (or the
agent’s designer) has in this particular theory. Credences are probabilities and therefore sum to one
across theories for a given agent. In this work, we assume the credences of theories are set and fixed,
e.g. by the system designer’s beliefs, or by taking a survey of relevant stakeholders, although an
ambitious and interesting research direction would explore how an RL agent could revise its own
credences from experience.
3.1 Maximizing Expected Choice-Worthiness
At first blush, it may appear that a morally uncertain agent ought to attempt to maximize expected
choice-worthiness (MEC) across the theories it has credence in. This can easily be accomplished
with ordinary reinforcement learning using a reward function corresponding to a credence-weighted
sum of the choice-worthiness according to each theory:
R(s, a, s′) =
∑
i
CiWi(s, a, s
′) (2)
The MEC approach is scale-sensitive: if W1 is measured in “utils” and W2 in “micro-utils”, theory
2 will be given undue weight under MEC. Therefore, when using MEC, it is critical that choice-
worthiness functions be normalized to a common scale. Section 4.1 demonstrates how unnormalized
theories can produce absurd results in MEC.
Finding an appropriate common scale, however, may often be an impossible task: consider an agent
with credence in a variant of utilitarianism in which the quantity of pleasure in the world is to be
maximized and the quantity of pain is to be minimized, and credence in a variant of Kantian ethics in
which the extent to which the agent uses people as ends in themselves rather than means to ends is to
be minimized. It is not at all clear how to find a scaling function such that these divergently-motivated
theories are resolved into a common scale. Indeed, it appears that these theories are fundamentally
incomparable.
The problem of incomparability prompts a search for a principled way to adjudicate between incom-
parable theories. Following MacAskill [6], we suggest that all theories that are comparable are first
aggregated into a single “virtual” theory using MEC before handling the resulting set of incomparable
theories (which includes the virtual theories created by MEC).
3.2 Voting Systems
In the absence of knowledge on how different theories might compare, we suggest that theories
should be treated according to a principle of Proportional Say, according to which theories should
have an influence that is proportional only to their credence and not to the particular details of their
choice-worthiness function (i.e. its scale) in the final decision. Several mathematical interpretations
of this principle are possible and may lead to different decision systems. However, the principle as a
whole points to a voting system as the decision procedure, with the particular form of voting resulting
from the precise definition of Proportional Say as well as other considerations. Supporting this idea,
voting systems are the dominant approach in the moral uncertainty philosophical literature [6, 7, 17].
Discussing voting systems naturally evokes Arrow’s desirability axioms, according to which desirable
properties for a voting system (framed here in the language of moral uncertainty) include:
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• Non-dictatorship: the outcome of the vote should not only reflect the preferences of a
single, predetermined theory.
• Pareto efficiency (Pareto): if all theories prefer action A to action B, action B shouldn’t be
chosen by the voting system.
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): if, in a given situation, action A is chosen
rather than action B, the addition of a new action X to the action set (with no other changes)
should not result in B being chosen instead.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [29] proves that any deterministic voting system which satisfies both
Pareto and IIA is necessarily a dictatorship. A dictatorship cannot reasonably be called a voting
system and certainly does not satisfy any reasonable definition of the principle of Proportional Say.
As a result, the standard approach in designing deterministic voting systems is to strategically break
one of Pareto or IIA in a way that is least detrimental to the particular use case. Before considering
these possibilities in detail, we discuss why a third alternative, that of using a stochastic voting system,
fails to provide a satisfactory solution in the case of moral uncertainty.
3.3 Stochastic Voting
The most prominent stochastic voting system is Random Dictator (RD) [30], in which a theory is
picked at random (with probability corresponding to its credence) to be dictator. This system does
not fail the Non-dictatorship axiom because the dictator is not predetermined prior to voting. RD
is particularly appealing because it is the only stochastic voting system that satisfies the axioms
in Gibbard [30], a set of axioms closely related to Arrow’s. However, RD suffers from a major flaw
we will call No Compromise: it is impossible for RD to ever select an action that is not the most
preferred action of any theory. This may lead to absurd results when theories strongly disagree on
which action is best but where an obvious compromise exists that would almost entirely satisfy all
theories, as depicted in Table 1a.
Sewell et al. [31] show that by relaxing Gibbard’s axioms, it is possible to design a stochastic voting
system that still satisfies all of Arrow’s axioms but does not suffer from No Compromise. However,
there is still a more general objection to stochastic voting systems as a whole. This objection can be
illustrated by the “doomsday button” scenario described in Table 1b: suppose a situation in which the
agent has access to an action that is considered extremely negative by the theories that represent the
overwhelming majority of credence (in Table 1b, 99.9% of the credence is allocated to theories that
find Action D very undesirable), but in which a given theory with extremely low credence strongly
favors this “doomsday button” action (as an example, the “doomsday button” may be an action that
shuts down the entire Internet forever, and the low-credence ethical theory may be one antagonistic to
all technology). In this situation, a stochastic voting system which satisfies any reasonable definition
of the principle of Proportional Say will have a non-zero chance of pressing the doomsday button.
Indeed, if the decision is repeated often enough, for example if stochastic voting is applied at every
time step of an episode, it is asymptotically guaranteed that the button will eventually be pressed.
A possible solution to this issue would be to ensure that the random selection is performed only
once, for instance by performing stochastic voting over all possible policies before deploying the
agent instead of over all possible actions at every step once the agent is deployed. However, this
prospect seems doubtful in practice, as many agents might be deployed by many different teams with
potentially different credences in various moral theories, thereby instantiating many independent
draws of chances to press the button. Further, even if such a single choice was practical, it then
complicates updating the credences under which the choice was made, i.e. as the system designer’s or
society’s views change, as each update seemingly would risk another chance of pressing the button.
3.4 Nash Voting
Because stochastic voting systems seem unpromising, we turn back to deterministic voting systems.
As previously indicated, committing to a deterministic voting system requires sacrificing either
Pareto or IIA of Arrow’s desirability axioms, at least in some cases. Here we note that the most
prominent voting system for moral uncertainty advocated in the philosophical literature is a form
of variance voting (Section 3.5) advocated by MacAskill [6], which sacrifices IIA. The literature
on moral philosophy has done little to consider the sequential nature of decision making, which is
key to reinforcement learning, and it is not immediately obvious how to adapt MacAskill’s variance
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Action A Action B Action C
Theory 1 0 99 100
Theory 2 100 99 0
(a) A voting system suffering from the No Compromise flaw will never pick action B, even though it seems
optimal under at least some sets of credences.
Action A Action B Action C Action D Credence
Theory 1 0 50 100 -1,000 39.9%
Theory 2 100 50 25 -10,000 60%
Theory 3 0 0 0 100 0.1%
(b) A “doomsday button” example. Most theories strongly dislike action D, but Theory 3 favors it and has
very low credence.
Table 1: Simple situations in which stochastic voting exhibits significant flaws.
voting to a sequential decision making context. Here we provide a line of reasoning that produces a
sequential version of variance voting as well as some alternatives, which we compare empirically in
Section 4.
To arrive at an appropriate voting system, we return to the principle of Proportional Say and provide
a partially formalized version in which the credence of a theory can be thought of as the fraction of
an imagined electorate which favors the given theory, and in which each member of the electorate is
allocated a voting budget:
Principle of Proportional Say Theories have Proportional Say if they are each allocated an equal
voting budget and are allowed to vote following the same cost structure, after which their votes are
scaled proportionally to their credences.
We call this formulation of proportional say the vote scaling formulation. In an alternative budget
scaling formulation, the budget (rather than the votes) of each theory is scaled proportionately to its
credence. While such budget scaling is intuitively appealing (and equivalent to vote scaling if the cost
function is linear), it can be shown to be undesirably sensitive (when the cost function is non-linear) to
theory individuation: Qualitatively different outcomes result from Whether nearly-identical theories
are treated as a single theory with a single budget, or multiple theories that subdivide that budget. An
example of this undesirable sensitivity is shown in Appendix B.
Thus formalized, the principle of Proportional Say suggests an algorithm we will call Nash voting
because it is inspired by game theory and has Nash equilibria [32] as its solution concept. At each time
step, each theory provides a continuous-valued vote for or against (in which case the vote is negative)
each of the available actions. The action with the largest credence-weighted vote at each time step
is executed. The cost of the theories’ votes (which here is a function of the votes’ magnitudes) at a
given time step is then subtracted from their remaining budget. If a theory overspends its remaining
budget, its votes are scaled so as to exactly match the remaining budget, resulting in a 0 budget for all
subsequent time steps (until the episode ends). Each theory tries to maximize its (possibly discounted)
sum of choice-worthiness in a competitive, multi-agent setting (where each separate theory is treated
as a separate subagent that influences controls of the singular object-level RL agent).
It is possible to train theories under Nash voting using multi-agent reinforcement learning (Ap-
pendix C.1), which aims towards convergence to a Nash equilibrium among competing theories.
Nash voting is analogous to cumulative voting when an absolute value cost function is used and
quadratic voting when a quadratic cost function is used [18], though these systems do not normally
allow negative votes. While a quadratic cost is generally considered superior to an absolute value cost
in the mechanism design literature [33], we found that our implementation of Nash voting produced
significantly more stable results with an absolute value cost. Thus, all Nash voting results presented in
the main text of this work use an absolute value cost, with quadratic cost results and their instabilities
being discussed in Appendix D.
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Because Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to be Pareto efficient in general [34], and because we
empirically find Nash voting to be more resistant to irrelevant alternatives than variance voting
(Section 4.5), we speculate that Nash voting satisfies (of Arrow’s desirability axioms) IIA but not
Pareto, though we provide no formal proof.
A drawback of Nash voting is that under certain circumstances it can exhibit two flaws: Stakes
Insensitivity (increasing the stakes for one theory and not the other does not increase the relative say
of the theory for which more is at stake) and No Compromise (defined in Section 3.3). Neither of
these flaws are consistently exhibited by Nash voting: under some circumstances, it can be stakes
sensitive and produce compromises. However, it is possible to produce situations in which these
flaws are exhibited in seemingly unacceptable ways, as detailed in Section 4.2 and 4.3. Further, we
empirically find that it is often difficult to obtain a stable equilibrium in Nash voting, and it some
cases it may even be impossible (Appendix E). While Nash voting has its disadvantages, it is worth
reflecting on its appeal: it strongly satisfies the principle of Proportional Say by allocating each theory
equal voting budget and enabling them to use it to optimize their own choice-worthiness.
3.5 Variance Voting
Reflecting on the situations in which the flaws of Stakes Insensitivity and No Compromise are
alleviated in Nash voting suggests another voting method, which can be seen as a variant of variance
voting as proposed by MacAskill [6], generalized to sequential decision making.
In particular, we find that that Stakes Insensitivity is alleviated when the agent knows it will have
to face multiple decisions in the same episode, and as a result needs to preserve its budget during
low-stakes time steps so more of it is available for high-stakes time steps. This phenomenon is more
pronounced as the number of future time steps increases, and does not occur at the final time step of
the episode (Section 4.2). This finding suggests the benefits of a voting system in which the budget is
formulated as an expected spending over an infinite number of time steps.
Further, we find that No Compromise is ultimately caused by the tactical voting that Nash voting
actively encourages. Following Cotton-Barratt [19], we distinguish tactical voting, in which an agent
falsely represents its preferences based on knowledge of the voting system and of other voters, from
strategic voting, in which an agent falsely represents its preferences based solely on knowledge of the
voting system but without knowledge of other voters’ preferences. That is, in tactical voting, one
theory optimizing against two specific other theories can focus votes on exactly where high-leverage
differences exist between it and its opposing theories, understanding that no voting power needs to be
wasted when the theories agree, even when those conflict-free situations are extremely high-stakes.
Such optimization can be undesirably adversarial, e.g. voting for actions that might lead to states
with high-stakes divergences among opposing theories, such that those theories waste their budgets,
thereby giving the optimizing theory more long-term influence. In contrast, in strategic voting, a
theory can make no assumptions about competing theories although it can seek to exploit the voting
system itself. When Nash voting agents are trained against random adversaries, so that tactical voting
is impossible (though strategic voting still is), compromise becomes possible (Section 4.3). This
insight suggests the potential benefits of a voting system which simulates how agents would vote if
they did not have knowledge of their adversaries.
While tactical and strategic voting are necessary concerns in voting systems involving humans, in
moral uncertainty we have complete knowledge of ethical theories’ preferences, and as a result
can force a non-tactical and non-strategic vote if necessary, an approach that is more practical than
preventing agents from acquiring information about their adversaries.
Reasoning about the flaws of Stakes Insensitivity and No Compromise thus leads us to devise a
voting system in which votes have to represent the true preferences of ethical theories (i.e. they are
represented by an affine transformation of the raw preferences) and in which the different theories are
constrained to meet a given target expected budget spending over an infinite number of time steps
and episodes. Appendix A shows that, if the voting cost is quadratic, such a system corresponds to
the following:
At each time step, the agent computes the expected future choice-worthiness Qi(s, a) for taking
action a at the current state s, and following the overall policy for all subsequent steps. It computes
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the mean choice-worthiness at that state
µi(s) =
1
k
∑
a
Qi(s, a), (3)
where k is the number of available actions. Its vote for action a is then
Vi(s, a) =
Qi(s, a)− µi(s)
σi
, (4)
where σi is the square root of the mean across time steps of the variance of choice-worthiness
according to the current theory
σi =
√√√√Es∼S [1
k
∑
a
(Qi(s, a)− µi(s))2
]
(5)
where S is the distribution of states the agent can encounter under the policy. This vote can be seen
as the choice-worthiness advantage over random actions to a particular theory from each action,
normalized by the variance of the advantage function over the distribution of states visited by the
current policy; in other words, a theory votes more in situations that are high-stakes for it on average.
As shown in Appendix A, variance normalization ensures that theories expand an equal amount of
voting power, as defined by the quadratic cost of the vote. The final action chosen by the variance
voting agent is then given by
pi(s) = argmax
a
∑
i
CiVi(s, a) (6)
Appealingly, this system reduces to MacAskill’s variance voting proposal, when constrained to the
same situation, i.e. when the decision problem is not sequential and the agent operates in a single
state. It assumes a quadratic voting cost, which is appealing for two reasons: (1) it corresponds to
the geometric intuition that the cost of voting can be thought of as a cost for departing from the
uniform theory (under which all actions are equally acceptable), when the amount of departure from
the uniform theory is measured in terms of Euclidian distance, and (2) such a voting system can be
shown to be immune to strategic voting (though not tactical voting) under certain assumptions [19].
Such immunity may not be necessary in the case of moral uncertainty because a vote that directly
represents the value of Qi(s, a) can be (and in this case, is) forced, but it helps preserve part of the
intuitive appeal of Nash voting, in that the votes produced by variance voting are strategically (though
not necessarily tactically) optimal from the point of view of each individual theory.
Because variance voting reduces to a weighted sum of the preferences of the various theories, it
results in Pareto optimal policies, by Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem [19]. Further, if the preferences
of the different theories are “rational” according to the von Neumann-Morgernstern definition of that
term, then the aggregate preferences produced by variance voting are also rational.
Arrow’s theorem tells us that a voting system cannot satisfy both Pareto and IIA. It is generally
accepted that Pareto is the more desirable property [6, 31] and thus could be seen as beneficial that
it is the axiom unsatisfied by variance voting. We show a particularly problematic case in which
variance voting violates IIA in Section 4.5. Alleviating IIA issues in variance voting is left to future
work and may turn out to be impossible due to the consequences of Arrow’s theorem.
3.5.1 Computing Preferences
We have thus far assumed the future preferences of theories are known, but not how they are computed.
The preference of a theory for a particular action is the expected future choice-worthiness of taking
that action and subsequently following the compromise policy, Qi(s, a). Due to the multi-agent
decision process, and because this function is specific to each theory, it cannot be learned using
ordinary off-policy Q-learning as that would result in unrealistically optimistic updates (Section 4.4).
Rather, we use the following target yi for theory i, similar to “local SARSA” as advocated by Russell
and Zimdars [35]:
yi =Wi(s, a) + γiQi(s
′, a′), (7)
where a′ is the action taken by the policy in state s′, which may either be the action produced by
variance voting or an -greedy action. In our implementation,  is annealed to 0 by the end of training
(Appendix C.1). We call this algorithm Variance-SARSA.
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Algorithm 1 Variance-SARSA
1: function TRAIN(N,K) # Train for N steps with batch size K
2: LQ ← 0
3: Lσ2 ← 0
4: for i ∈ [1 . . . N ] do
5: If start of a new episode, randomly sample new credences C
6: if RAND <  then
7: a′ ← random action
8: else
9: a′ ← VARIANCEVOTE(s, C)
10: end if
11: for all theories i do
12: if i > 1 then
13: # Update Q function loss
14: LQ ← LQ + (Qi(s, a, C)− (Wi(s, a, s′) + γiQi(s′, a′, C)))2
15: end if
16: # Update variance loss
17: Lσ2 ← Lσ2 +
(
σ2i (C)− 1k
∑
a(Qi(s, a)− µi(s))2
)2
18: end for
19: a′ ← a
20: Take action a in current state s, observe next state s′
21: if i mod K then
22: Update Q based on LQ and σ2 based on Lσ2
23: LQ ← 0
24: Lσ2 ← 0
25: end if
26: end for
27: end function
28: function VARIANCEVOTE(s, C) # Variance voting for state s with credences C
29: V ← {0, 0, · · · , 0}
30: for each theory i do
31: µi ← 1|A|
∑
aQi(s, a, C)
32: for each action a do
33: Va ← Va + Ci Qi(s,a,C)−µi√
σ2i (C)
34: end for
35: end for
36: return argmaxa Va
37: end function
3.5.2 Updating Credences
It may be desirable for the designer of morally uncertain agents to quickly update the credences
of their agents as they update their uncertainty about ethical theories, and to enable designers to
understand the effects of credence upon the agent’s policy. We propose that credence updating can be
done without retraining the policy by credence-conditioning the learned Q functions of the theories,
and training them in simulation under a wide variety of credences before deploying them in the real
world, an approach analogous to UVFA [36]. In addition to Q functions, the variance voting system
requires an estimate of the mean variance of the preferences of each theory. The variance of different
theories is affected by the policy actually taken, and thus is impacted indirectly by the credences. To
address this complication, we propose that this estimate be obtained from a credence-conditioned
regression model which can be trained alongside the Q functions. Because the model should estimate
the mean variance for a given credence, we train it here with a quadratic regression loss function
(mean squared error).
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Figure 1: Gridworld versions of the trolley problem. The trolley (T) normally moves right at each
time step. If the agent (A) is standing on the switch (S) tile by the time it reaches the fork in the tracks
(+) tile, the trolley will be redirected down and crash into the bystander(s), causing them harm. The
agent may also push a large man (L) onto the tracks, harming the large man but stopping the trolley.
Otherwise, the trolley will keep going and crash into the people standing on the tracks represented by
random variable X . A guard (G) may protect the large man, in which case the agent needs to lie to
the guard before it is able to push the large man. Finally, in one variant the agent is be able to trigger
a “doomsday” event (D) in which a large number of people are harmed.
4 Experiments
We now illustrate various properties of the voting systems for moral uncertainty introduced in this
work, and in particular focus on the trade-offs that exist between them.
All our experiments are based on four related gridworld environments (depicted in Figure 1) that
tease out differences between various voting systems. These environments are all based on the trolley
problem [8], commonly used within moral philosophy to highlight moral intuitions and conflicts
between ethical theories. In this thought experiment, an out of control trolley is about to crash
into several people standing on the tracks (in our experiments, this number will vary and is thus
represented by X), harming them. The agent may let this unfortunate event happen, but is also
presented with one or more affordances to prevent it. These affordances, however, risk harming other
bystanders in various ways, thus forcing the agent to make an ethical tradeoff.
In the classic variant (Figure 1a), for example, the agent is located near a switch that will redirect
the trolley to another set of tracks, thus preventing harm to multiple people. Unfortunately, a single
innocent bystander is standing on the other set of tracks and will be harmed if the trolley is redirected.
A purely utilitarian calculation would prescribe that one should minimize total harms inflicted, thus
flipping the switch would be preferred as long as X > 1. However, some deontological theories
draw a distinction between harms caused by an agent’s direct intervention and those caused through
its inaction. That is, such a theory might consider that the harm to the X people is relatively
permissible because it is caused by the agent’s inaction, while the harm to the 1 innocent bystander by
flipping the switch would be actively caused by the agent, and thus highly impermissible. A simple
choice-worthiness setup for this particular scenario is given in Table 2.
4.1 MEC and Incomparability
We first illustrate the problems arising when applying MEC with incomparable theories. Figure 2
shows a set of preferences for the “classic” version of the trolley problem (Figure 1a), with a single
version of utilitarianism for which the choice-worthiness is the negative of the number of people
harmed in the environment, and two versions of deontology: in the first, switching corresponds to a -1
choice-worthiness, while the second is “boosted” so that switching is given a -10 choice-worthiness.
These two options correspond to the same underlying preference function, and because it is unclear
how to compare the units used by utilitarianism (number of people harmed in this case) and those
used by deontology (in this case some measure of how much the agent caused the harms that did
occur to happen), there is no fact of the matter as to which of the two representations for deontology
is more correct in this context. However, as Figure 2a and 2b demonstrate, the choice that is made
has a strong impact on the final outcome. By contrast, variance voting produces the same result no
matter which scale is used for deontology (Figure 2c).
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Crash into 1 Crash into X
Utilitarianism -1 -X
Deontology -1 0
Boosted Deontology -10 0
Table 2: Preferences in the classic trolley problem.
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(a) MEC Utilitarianism vs Deon-
tology.
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(b) MEC Utilitarianism vs
Boosted Deontology.
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(c) Variance voting Utilitarianism
vs Deontology or Boosted Deon-
tology.
Figure 2: MEC is sensitive to the particular scale of utility functions. MEC produces inconsistent
results between utilitarnism and deontology depending on whether the deontological theory is scaled
by a factor of 1 (a) or 10 (b). However, because there is not truth of the matter as to how the scale of
units used by the deontological theory compare to that of the utiliarian theory, rescaling should have
no impact on the final results. Variance voting produces the same result no matter the rescaling (c).
4.2 Nash Voting and Stakes Insensitivity
The classic trolley problem setup also allows us to demonstrate stakes insensitivity in Nash voting.
Table 3 shows the preferences of two theories in the simple trolley problem. IfX = 1, utilitarianism is
indifferent between the two actions, so deontology should prevail as long as it has non-zero credence,
and the agent should not flip the switch. As X increases, the preference of utilitarianism for switching
should be taken in greater and greater consideration. In particular, if X is very large, even a relatively
small credence in utilitarianism should suffice to justify flipping the switch, while if X is close to 1, a
relatively larger credence seems like it would be necessary. This is Stakes Sensitivity.
However, Figure 3a shows that Nash voting does not exhibit Stakes Sensitivity at all in this particular
example: rather, whichever theory has the highest credence gets its way no matter the relative stakes.
This is because both theories have no reason not to spend their entire budget voting for their preferred
action, no matter how small or large the difference in preference versus the alternative.
Stakes Insensitivity is not a fundamental feature of Nash voting, however. In particular, it can be
stakes sensitive if it expects to make multiple decisions in sequence, with the stakes of future decisions
being unknown, as often happens in real-world situations. In Figure 3b, each episode consists of two
iterations of the classic trolley problem instead of just one (i.e. after the first iteration completes, the
state is reset and another iteration begins, without the episode terminating or the theories’ voting
budgets being replenished), with the number of people on the tracks X being resampled during the
second iteration, so that the agent does not know the stakes of the second iteration during the first.
In this case, we observe that the decision boundary for the first trolley problem shows some stakes
sensitivity: when the stakes are relatively low in the first step, the agent preserves its budget for the
likely higher stakes second step.
Unlike Nash voting, variance voting exhibits stakes sensitivity no matter how many decisions must
be made in the environment, corresponding to the intuition that it assumes an expected budget spend
across an infinite number of timesteps, no matter the actual number of timesteps in an episode.
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Crash into 1 Crash into X
Utilitarianism -1 -X
Deontology -1 0
Table 3: Preferences in the classic trolley problem.
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(a) Nash voting.
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(b) Iterated Nash voting (unsta-
ble, see Appendix Figure 9).
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(c) Variance voting
Figure 3: Nash voting can be Stakes Insensitive in the classic trolley problem. (a) Nash voting is
completely stakes insensitive when operating in the classic trolley problem. (b) Requiring an agent
to navigate two separate trolley problems before an episode ends produces some stakes sensitivity
in Nash voting (the decision boundary is not smooth due to instabilities in training; Appendix E).
(c) Variance voting, which can be thought of as a form of Nash voting across infinite timesteps, has
complete stakes sensitivity even in the non-iterated case.
4.3 Nash Voting and No Compromise
An additional flaw Nash voting suffers from is No Compromise: Figure 1b shows a situation in which
the agent is presented with three options: letting the trolley crash into a large number of people,
redirecting the trolley onto a different track on which 2 people are standing (note that only 1 person
is standing on the track in the classic version), or pushing a large man onto the tracks, stopping the
trolley but causing the large man harm. While utilitarianism simply counts harms, deontology only
counts harms caused by the agent. Further, it puts a larger negative weight on pushing the large man
than on redirecting the trolley, in keeping with common deontological theories such as the Doctrine
of Double Effect [13].
In the double trolley problem, utilitarianism will always prefer pushing the large man as long as
X > 1, while deontology will always prefer doing nothing. However, the option of flipping the
switch is appealing as a compromise, as it will partially satisfy utilitarianism as long as X > 2 and
also avoids the worst possible case for deontology.
We would thus expect that a voting system capable of compromise would select this option if the
credences of utilitarianism and deontology are close enough. However, in Nash voting, whichever
theory has the upper hand in terms of credence, as small as it may be, is capable of imposing its
preference to the fullest extent possible, and as a result Nash voting will only ever select “Push”
or “Nothing”, and always ignore the compromise option “Switch”. This result is demonstrated
empirically in Figure 4a.
As mentioned in Section 3.5, the lack of compromise exhibited by Nash voting is due in part to its
excessive knowledge of its adversaries and thus its ability to counter them perfectly if its credence is
sufficient. Figure 4b shows the outcome of an experiment in which, during training, each of the two
agent is randomly chosen to optimize either for utilitarianism, deontology, or “altered deontology“
(Table 1a). Note that altered deontology is not meant to represent a valid ethical theory but rather
to help simulate (during training only) a situation in which Nash voting does not have a priori
knowledge of which opponent it is facing, thus limiting its tactical voting ability (though it can
still vote strategically, as defined in Section 3.5). During testing, utilitarianism is always facing
deontology, and we observe that the compromise action of switching is occasionally chosen, showing
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that the No Compromise flaw of Nash voting is indeed partly caused by its ability to vote tactically,
and motivating the forced votes used in variance voting.
Indeed, Figure 4c shows that variance voting easily produces the compromise solution, with the
switch option being chosen as long as credences between the two theories are relatively similar, and
being increasingly favored as stakes are raised.
Push L Crash into 2 Crash into X
Utilitarianism -1 -2 -X
Deontology -4 -1 0
Altered Deontology -1 -4 0
Table 4: Preferences for the double trolley problem. Altered Deontology only used for Nash voting
with unknown adversary.
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Switch
Push
(a) Nash voting.
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(b) Nash voting with unknown ad-
versary (unstable, see Appendix
Figure 10).
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(c) Variance voting.
Figure 4: Nash voting can suffer from No Compromise in the double trolley problem. (a) Nash
voting between utilitarianism and deontology never produces the compromise “switch” option (except
for minor artifacts near the decision boundary). (b) Nash voting reaches compromises when trained
with an unknown adversary. (c) Variance voting exhibits compromise no matter the training procedure.
4.4 Q-Learning and the Illusion of Control
It has been recognized in the multi-agent literature [35] that aggregating preferences obtained
using Q-learning produces a phenomenon known as the illusion of control: the Q-learning target
yi = r + γimaxa′ Qi(s
′, a′) implicitly assumes that the action that would be taken by the policy in
the next state would be whichever maximizes the reward for theory i. However, the preferred next
state action might vary across different theories, and thus which one is ultimately taken will depend
on the relative credences of the theories.
This issue can be illustrated using the guard trolley problem (Figure 1c): in this problem, the agent is
given the option to push a large man to save the people on the tracks, but to do so it must first tell a lie
to a guard protecting the large man. As can be seen in Table 5, utilitarianism is indifferent to lying to
the guard, while deontology views it as negative, but not nearly as bad as pushing the large man. As a
result, the possibility of lying to the guard only to fail to push the large man is strictly dominated
as it satisfies neither utilitarianism nor deontology, while the options of doing nothing at all or both
lying the guard and pushing the large man are both possible depending on the stakes and credences
involved.
As seen in Figure 5a, however, when the preferences of the different theories are trained using
traditional Q-learning instead of Variance-SARSA, lying to the guard without pushing the large
man is the outcome in many cases. This is because in the first step, utilitarianism’s vote for lying is
excessively high as the Q function for utilitarianism mistakenly believes it will be able to push the
large man in the following step. Instead, unless the credence of utilitarianism is particularly high, it
will get outvoted in step 2. Figure 5b shows that when using Variance-SARSA, this illusion of control
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does not occur and the “Lie Only” option is never chosen. Like Variance-SARSA, Nash voting is
immune to the illusion of control (Figure 5c).
Both Variance-SARSA and Nash voting suffer from mild stability issues (Appendix E) in this
particular problem, due to the fact that that the votes near the decision boundary need to be resolved
with high precision to avoid the dominated “lie only” outcome, which is not perfectly achieved by the
hyperparameters used in these experiments.
Lie to the guard Push L Crash into X
Utilitarianism 0 -1 -X
Deontology -0.5 -4 0
Table 5: Preferences in the guard trolley problem.
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(a) Q-learning.
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(b) Variance-SARSA (unstable,
see Appendix Figure 8).
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pendix Figure 11).
Figure 5: Q-learning suffers from the illusion of control. (a) The value function is learned with
Q-learning for each theory, resulting in the undesirable outcome where the “Lie only” option is often
selected. (b) The use of Variance-SARSA results in “Lie only” never being chosen. (c) Nash voting is
also largely immune to this outcome. “Lie only” is selected in rare cases in both (b) and (c), but this
results from minor training instabilities rather than it being the optimal outcome for these methods
(Appendix E).
4.5 Variance Voting and IIA
As a voting method that satisfies the Pareto condition, variance voting cannot satisfy IIA in all cases.
To understand this limitation in practice, it is worth examining a specific example. A representative
and problematic such example is given by comparing the outcomes from variance voting in the classic
trolley problem shown in Figure 1a to those in the “doomsday” trolley problem in Figure 1d. In the
latter problem, the agent is able to perform an action capable of harming a large number of people
(invoking the “doomsday”).
As shown in Table 6, neither theory is ever willing to select the “doomsday” option, a clear example
of an irrelevant alternative. However, comparing Figures 6b and 6a shows that the addition of this
irrelevant alternative has a significant effect on the final outcome, i.e. favoring doing nothing, which
is the outcome preferred by deontology. The reason is that the presence of the doomsday action
increases the variance of utilitarianism more than that of deontology (due to the particular choice-
worthiness preferences given in Table 6), which effectively reduces the strength of the utilitarian
vote against “Crash into X.” Another way to view this phenomenon is that both utilitarianism and
deontology are now spending some of their voting power voting against doomsday, but utilitarianism
is spending more of its voting power doing so, thereby reducing the strength of its vote on other
actions.
It may be objected that a trivial solution to this problem exists: it is obvious based from the preferences
of the agents that “doomsday” is a strictly dominated option, and could therefore be taken out of the
voting entirely before computing variances. However, this objection does not address the general
issue, as adding a third theory with a preference for doomsday with even a small credence would
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force us to bring back doomsday as an option and thus bring back the issue. It may be possible
to find alternate ways to avoid taking the doomsday option (or other irrelevant alternatives) into
account when computing the variances (such as by only considering actions actually taken by the
current policy), a possibility which we leave to future work. Another solution would be to use Nash
voting, which is indeed immune to this issue (Figure 6c), but suffers from the No Compromise and
Stakes Insensitivity issues mentioned in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. A full solution to this issue would
require further work, and may not be possible without producing other undesirable side-effects due to
Arrow’s theorem.
Crash into 1 Crash into X Doomsday
Utilitarianism -1 -X -300
Deontology -1 0 -10
Table 6: Preferences in the doomsday trolley problem.
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(a) Variance voting in the classic
environment.
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(b) Variance voting in an environ-
ment with a doomsday button.
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(c) Nash voting in both the classic
and doomsday environments.
Figure 6: Variance voting does not have the IIA property. (a) When the “doomsday” option is
absent, switching (the option preferred by utilitarianism) is chosen in many cases. (b) Adding the
“doomsday” action changes the outcome of variance voting from “switch” to “nothing” in many
situations, even though “doomsday” itself is never chosen, and is thus an irrelevant alternative. (c)
Nash voting is unaffected by the irrelevant alternative in this example.
5 Related Work
This work is related to and builds off of work in several fields, including multi-agent RL, multi-
objective RL, AI safety, moral philosophy, and machine ethics.
5.1 AI Safety
Moral uncertainty is related to several topics studied within AI safety [37, 38], which is concerned
with solving technical problems that impede creating AI that safely does what its designers intended
it to do. Uncertainty in reward functions [39, 40] is similar to the formulation of uncertainty over
ethical theories, although here the focus is not on reducing that uncertainty, but how to perform RL
under it, especially when the reward functions implied by the different theories are not comparable in
scale. Another connection is to the problem of avoiding negative side effects [37, 41, 42], i.e. how
to accomplish a task while minimizing undesired impact. Accomplishing a task while balancing
uncertainty over ethical theories can be seen as a different way of constraining impact, grounded in
what matters to humans, instead of attempting to explicitly measure irreversibility or impact on what
goals remain attainable.
5.2 Multi-agent and Multi-objective RL
The Nash Voting method models a single agent’s behaviors as a voting process among competing
ethical theories, in effect, a multi-agent system that seeks compromise to control a single agent. The
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optimization algorithm used is a form of multi-agent RL (MARL [43]), namely a form of competitive
MARL. Other work has looked at multi-agent RL in a more traditional sense for encouraging
cooperation among distinct agents [44, 45]. Our work differs in that it seeks to encourage ethical
behavior through internal competition between ethical theories.
5.3 Moral Philosophy
The question of moral uncertainty has only recently been of focused interest within moral philoso-
phy [6, 7, 46], and this work is among the first to connect it to machine learning [47], and the first to
offer a concrete implementation. One hope is that working towards concrete implementations of moral
uncertainty may also offer philosophical insights, as computational implementation requires notions
to become workably precise – in the words of Daniel Dennett, AI “makes philosophy honest [48].”
Our work thus also relates to work in computational philosophy [9, 10], wherein computational
techniques are used to advance philosophy. For example, work in game theory studying the evolution
of cooperation [49], or in agent-based modeling of artificial morality [50] has connections to ethics;
instead of examining the conditions under which moral behavior is advantageous, our approach
focuses on integrating multiple human ethical views into a single RL agent.
5.4 Machine Ethics
This paper can be seen as fitting into the field of machine ethics [51, 52], which seeks to give moral
capabilities to computational agents. Many approaches in machine ethics seek to create an agent
that embodies a particular moral theory – e.g. agents that implement versions of utilitarianism [53],
deontology [54], and prima facie duties. Our work complements such approaches by seeking to
combine multiple ethical theories within an agent. Additionally, like Abel et al. [3], we attempt to
highlight practical bridges between machine ethics and RL.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper proposes and tests algorithms for handling moral uncertainty in RL. Rather than arguing for
which of the proposed algorithms is best, we hypothesize that impossibility results imply a spectrum
of plausible algorithms that cover the trade-offs among competing desiderata in decision-making
under moral uncertainty. Which algorithm is most appropriate for a given domain may depend on
particularities of the competing theories and the domain itself, i.e. how much is lost by sacrificing
Pareto efficiency as Nash voting does (do the domain and theories create the possibility of highly
uncooperative Nash equilibria?), or how influenceable is the outcome of the system to seemingly
orthogonal details (as in variance voting). An interesting direction for future study is to derive better
understanding of how severe these trade-offs are in practice, which would inform what kind of
algorithmic improvements are most important.
Towards that end, a direction for future work is to test algorithms for moral uncertainty (and machine
ethics in general) in more complex RL domains, e.g. in a high-dimensional deep RL setting. Interest-
ingly, as a whole there has been little work in machine ethics that attempts to scale up in this way,
e.g. all RL-like works in machine ethics the authors are aware of (including this work) use relatively
simple agents or robots within highly-constrained environments (for example, Winfield et al. [55]).
One challenge is thus to create more complicated machine ethics benchmark tasks. Most existing
RL benchmarks, such as Atari or Go, are designed to fit the standard RL paradigm, i.e. a single
metric of success or progress. It may be possible to retrofit some such benchmarks to include various
conceptions of morality – i.e. instrumenting an existing video game to include e.g. the utilities of
“enemies” or “bystanders,” or the violations of deontological considerations such as treating other
agents as means to ends, breaking explicit or implicit contracts with other agents, or breaking in-game
laws. A related challenge is to create implementations of ethical reward functions that can be applied
in complex simulations (or potentially in the real world). Likely, previous work in machine ethics can
provide a useful foundation [52, 53, 55], but machine learning may have an important role to play,
e.g. classifiers can be trained to recognize morally-relevant events and situations, such as bodily harm
or its potential, emotional responses of humans and animals, and violations of laws or social norms.
In other words, machine learning may have an important role to play in constructing ethical reward
functions.
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One benefit of translating moral uncertainty from a philosophical framework to a sequential decision-
making one, is that more of the gritty complications of real-world moral decision-making come into
clarity, which may suggest concrete research problems or connections to existing research in RL.
For example, sufficient exploration of the environment is critical to discovering optimal policies;
that is, to learn how to maximize a reward function requires searching through possible options, and
an insufficiently broad search may fail to reveal the best possible policy. Similarly, in RL under
moral uncertainty, there is potential for moral deception while learning, i.e. to converge prematurely
to a policy that is easily found but is far worse ethically (by all theories with credence) than more
complicated behaviors yet unexplored. For example, in realistic situations that first appear to be moral
dilemmas, there may sometimes be subtle affordances that entirely transcend the moral dilemma –
e.g. a hidden fail-safe button on the trolley that requires a complicated sequence of actions to engage.
Indeed, in human life there is skill in behaving ethically; it is not sufficient to be motivated to do
good, but one must learn how effectively to do so, which can be extremely challenging.
Relatedly, one aspiration of this line of work is to ground out moral thinking computationally. One
ambitious aim is to empirically examine implementations of common moral theories and how they
interact under uncertainty, to see if such a system well-models ethical decision making by humans.
Another hope is that ethically-included RL algorithms might provide useful tools for supporting
decision makers. That is, by providing humans ways to formulate ethical sequential decision-making
situations that machines could optimize, the resulting policies might illuminate possibilities that
humans had not yet considered. Such algorithms might enable handling ethical situations at scale in
a principled way, rather than requiring a human to anticipate all possible outcomes and hard-code
how to handle each new scenario, or alternatively could serve as a last-resort backstop for when
unanticipated situations arise.
A final ambitious direction for future work is to explore mechanisms through which an agent can
itself update its credences in moral theories. That is, what might provide a principled foundation
for machine meta-ethics [56, 57], i.e. a basis for an agent to evaluate how reasonable a moral theory
is, either through computational reflection or through empirical evidence gained through observing
its actions and their consequences. For example, one consideration humans use to rule out moral
theories is to explore whether society would become nightmarish if important decisions were made
under the guidance of that theory (reductio ad absurdum). For example, this principle is often used to
argue against naive forms of act utilitarianism: Such utilitarianism would seemingly support saving
four lives by harvesting five transplantable organs from a healthy person visiting the hospital to
get a routine test; yet, seemingly no one would want to live in a world where visiting the hospital
could lead to such an outcome. In a similar way, a model-based RL agent could explore whether the
consequences of all agents adopting a particular moral theory induced catastrophic outcomes (e.g.
by its own standards, or by the standards of a theory that provides an underlying currency between
theories [58]), and reduce its credence in that theory in such circumstances.
In conclusion, motivated by the need for machines capable of handling decisions with moral weight,
this work attempts to bridge recent work in moral philosophy on moral uncertainty with the field of
RL. We introduce algorithms that can balance optimizing reward functions with incomparable scales,
and show their behavior on sequential decision versions of moral dilemmas. Overall, the hope is to
encourage future research into the promising and exciting intersection of machine ethics and modern
machine learning.
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A From Nash Voting to Variance Voting
Here we show that, under certain assumptions, if votes are forced to represent a theory’s preferences,
Nash voting produces the same votes as variance voting. We assume an environment with a discrete
action space of k actions, and a episode length of n. Without loss of generality, we assume a total
budget of nk (different budgets would results in votes being scaled by the same constant factor across
theories).
First, we define what it means for votes to represent a theory’s preferences. As mentioned in Section 3,
any affine transformation of the preferences of a theory effectively represents the same theory. As
such, we would like the votes at state s to be an affine transformation of the preferences Qi(s, a) of
the theory at state s, or
Vi(s, a) =
Qi(s, a)− βi(s)
αi
, (8)
Thus, in the context in which votes are forced to represent preferences, Nash voting controls the
parameters of the affine transformation αi and βi(s) (rather than the votes directly). Here, the voting
cost is quadratic, and we make the strong simplifying assumption that the sequence of states visited
during the episode is fixed. The cost is thus:
Costi(s) =
∑
a
Vi(s, a)
2 =
∑
a
[Qi(s, a)− βi(s)]2
α2i
. (9)
The use of a function βi(s) instead of a constant βi comes from the observation that whatever value
βi takes will not have a direct effect on the outcome of the vote, as each action will receive an equal
bonus/penalty from βi. Thus, making it conditional on the state provides an additional affordance to
minimize cost while not affecting the notion that votes ought to represent preferences.
The Nash voting agent attempts to maximize its voting impact while keeping its total cost across
timesteps within the nk budget. Since βi(s) has no impact on the outcome of the vote, it should be
chosen purely to minimize Ci(s). Thus it can be shown by differentiation that
βi(s) = µi(s) =
1
k
∑
a
Qi(s, a).
To maximize its voting power, Nash voting agent would maximize the magnitude of its votes, while
staying within the nk budget, thus we need the sum of costs across timesteps
∑
sCost(s) to be equal
to nk, or ∑
s
∑
a
[Qi(s, a)− µi(s)]2
α2i
= nk.
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Rearranging gives
α2i =
1
n
∑
s
1
k
∑
a
[Qi(s, a)− µi(s)]2 ,
so, defining σ2i (s) =
1
k
∑
a [Qi(s, a)− µi(s)]2 (the variance of the Q-values at state s), we get
αi =
√
1
n
∑
s
σ2i (s) =
√
Es∼S [σ2i (s)], (10)
which is the form of variance voting as presented in this work.
B Budget Scaling and Theory Individuation
Here we show an example in which the budget scaling formulation of the principle of Proportional
Say (Section 3.4) is highly sensitive to theory individuation.
Suppose an agent is facing the classic trolley problem (Figure 1a), and has 40% credence in deontology
and 60% credence in utilitarianism. Suppose that the voting cost function is quadratic, and that only
positive votes are permitted (this latter assumption merely simplifies the illustrative example without
loss of generality). Because the decision situation in the classic trolley problem is assumed to be
the only one the theory will face, theories will spend their entire budget voting for their preferred
option. In the budget scaling formulation, the budget for deontology would be 0.4, for a vote in favor
of “Do Nothing” of
√
0.4 ≈ 0.63, and the budget for utilitarianism would be 0.6, for a vote in favor
of “Switch” of
√
0.6 ≈ 0.77. Therefore, “Switch” will win with 55% of the vote.
Now suppose the system designer is made aware of a subtle distinction between two forms of
deontology, so deontology is now split into deontology A, with a 20% credence, and deontology B,
also with 20% credence. However, the preferences of both variants of deontology still favor the “Do
Nothing” option in the classic trolley problem scenario. As a result, in the budget scaling scenario,
the budget for each variant of deontology is 0.2, for a total vote of 2
√
0.2 ≈ 0.89 in favor of “Do
Nothing”, while utilitarianism (which remains unsplit) still provides the same
√
0.6 ≈ 0.77 in favor
of “Switch.” Therefore, “Do Nothing” wins with 54% of the vote in this scenario.
Thus, even though it would seem like the split of deontology into deontology A and deontology B
should have been inconsequential (since both versions have the same preferences as before in the
case at hand), it in fact completely reversed the outcome of the vote in the budget scaling formulation.
This is the problem of theory individuation. In the context of moral uncertainty, this problem can be
highly significant, as there exist countless variants of most ethical theories, and the possibility that
a given ethical theory will later be found to correspond to two different theories when analyzing a
particular edge-case is ever-present. As a result, this work only analyzes the vote scaling formulation
of the principle of Proportional Say, as that formulation is not vulnerable to theory individuation in
situations where the preferences of the individualized theories are unchanged.
C Implementation Details
In both Nash voting and variance voting, the current object on each tile of the grid world environment
is given as a one-hot encoded vector. Additionally, the state contains the value of X (the number of
people on the tracks) as well as the current credences. The action space always has a size of 4 (up,
down, left, right). If the agent takes an action that runs into one of the boundaries of the environments,
the effect is to stay in place.
All experiments are trained for 10 million timesteps, with decision boundaries plotted every 500,000
steps. The figures presented in the paper correspond to the last decision boundary plot, except in
unstable cases (Appendix E). In both Nash voting and variance voting, training is done with 32
actors running concurrently, and with a learning rate of 0.001. At each episode during training, X is
sampled uniformly (and continuously, so that X need not be an integer) from 1 to 10.
The code for the implementations of Nash voting and variance voting as well as the trolley prob-
lem environments used in this work can be found at https://github.com/uber-research/
normative-uncertainty.
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C.1 Nash Voting
In this work, Nash voting is implemented using a simple form of multi-agent RL, in which multiple
reinforcement learning agents compete each to maximize their own rewards. In our implementation,
the two agents are implemented as two separate neural networks (each with 2 hidden layers of 64
nodes with ReLU [59] activations) trained using PPO [60] from the same experience and at the same
frequency of training, namely one episode of training every 128 timesteps for each environment, for
a total training batch size of 4,096.
In an environment with k actions, the action space of each Nash voting agent is a vector of k
continuous value, corresponding to the votes for (or against) each action. If the votes at a given
timestep exceed the remaining budget, they are scaled so as to exactly match the remaining budget,
leaving no further budget for future timesteps. While the policy is stochastic during training (sampled
from a normal distribution, the mean and standard deviation of which are the outputs of the policy
network), it was forced to be deterministic when generating the decision boundary plots (by setting
the action to the mean output by the policy network).
As well as the state at the current timestep, agents are provided with their current remaining budget
as an input. In iterated Nash voting, the state also contains the number of remaining trolley problems
in the episode. In Nash voting with unknown adversaries, an additional one-hot input is supplied
specifying whether the agent should act as utilitarian, deontologist, or altered deontologist.
C.2 Variance-SARSA
Variance-SARSA is implemented following Algorithm 1. Each theory is associated with a separate
Q(s, a) and σ2 network. One iteration of training for both the σ2 models and the Q(s, a) models
occurs every 32 timestep for each environment, for a training batch size of 32. The Q(s, a) networks
are fully connected networks with 2 hidden layers with 32 nodes and ReLU activations. The σ2 also
have 2 hidden layers with 32 nodes and ReLU activations, as well as an exponential output activation
to ensure a strictly positive output value. During training, -greedy exploration with  starting at
0.1 and decaying linearly to 0 was performed. When generating the decision boundary plots, the
deterministic policy was used without added stochasticity.
D Quadratic Cost in Nash Voting
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(a) Double trolley problem (Fig-
ure 4a)
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(b) Double trolley problem with
unknown adversary (Figure 4b).
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(c) Guard trolley problem (Fig-
ure 5c).
Figure 7: Experiments with significant differences between Nash voting with quadratic cost
and Nash voting with absolute value cost. Each subfigure corresponds to a particular Nash voting
experiment from the main paper, but uses a quadratic cost instead of an absolute value cost.
The results in Figures 3a, 3b and 6c are identical whether an absolute value cost or a quadratic cost
is used. Figure 7 shows the three cases in which different results are obtained with a quadratic cost
function. In Figure 7a, the compromise solution is produced near the decision boundary, which might
indicate that Nash voting with a quadratic cost does not suffer from No Compromise. However, the
high instability of Nash voting in this particular problem (Figure 14) as well as the fact that Nash
voting with quadratic cost produces the strictly dominated “Lie Only” solution in the guard trolley
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problem (Figure 7c) suggest that this apparently positive outcome is likely due to training instabilities
rather than genuine robustness to No Compromise. In Figure 7b, the solution to the double trolley
problem with unknown adversary has an extremely poorly defined decision boundary. All examples
are highly unstable, as shown in Figures 14, 15 and 17.
E Instability
We observe empirically that the decision boundary does not always reach a stable equilibrium during
training. Thus, in the case of unstable experiments, the decision boundary plot that (according to
a subjective assessment) best represents the equilibrium point was used in the main text instead of
the decision plot produced at the end of training. This appendix section provides the full sets of 20
decision plots for all unstable experiments.
The instability phenomenon is most common in Nash voting (Figures 11, 9 10 and 12), though it
occasionally occurs in variance voting (Figure 8). Further, Figures 12 and 16 show the outcome of an
experiment not included in the main text in which iterated Nash voting (presented in Section 4.2)
is used on the double trolley problem (Section 4.3). In this experiment, Nash voting is completely
unstable and it is unclear whether a stable equilibrium exists at all. By contrast, the only unstable case
in variance voting (Figure 8) may be alleviated by tweaking the hyperparameters (for example by
annealing the learning rate to ensure convergence), since it merely oscillates around an equilibrium
instead of converging to it.
E.1 Variance Voting
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(a) 0.5M iterations
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(b) 1.0M iterations
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(c) 1.5M iterations
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(d) 2.0M iterations
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(e) 2.5M iterations
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(f) 3.0M iterations
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(g) 3.5M iterations
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(h) 4.0M iterations
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(i) 4.5M iterations
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(j) 5.0M iterations
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(k) 5.5M iterations
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(l) 6.0M iterations
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(m) 6.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(n) 7.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(o) 7.5M iterations
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(p) 8.0M iterations
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(q) 8.5M iterations
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(r) 9.0M iterations
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(s) 9.5M iterations
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(t) 10.0M iterations
Figure 8: Instability of variance voting in the guard trolley problem (Figure 5b).
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E.2 Nash Voting with Absolute Value Cost
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(a) 0.5M iterations
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(b) 1.0M iterations
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(c) 1.5M iterations
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(d) 2.0M iterations
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(e) 2.5M iterations
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(f) 3.0M iterations
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(g) 3.5M iterations
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(h) 4.0M iterations
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(i) 4.5M iterations
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(j) 5.0M iterations
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(k) 5.5M iterations
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(l) 6.0M iterations
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(m) 6.5M iterations
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(n) 7.0M iterations
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Figure 9: Instability of iterated Nash voting (Figure 3b).
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Figure 10: Instability of Nash voting with unknown adversary (Figure 4b).
26
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(a) 0.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(b) 1.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(c) 1.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(d) 2.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(e) 2.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(f) 3.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(g) 3.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(h) 4.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(i) 4.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(j) 5.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(k) 5.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(l) 6.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(m) 6.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(n) 7.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(o) 7.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(p) 8.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(q) 8.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(r) 9.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(s) 9.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(t) 10.0M iterations
Figure 11: Instability of Nash voting in the guard trolley problem (Figure 5c).
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Figure 12: Instability of iterated Nash voting in the double trolley problem.
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Figure 13: Instability of iterated Nash voting with quadratic cost.
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Figure 14: Instability of Nash voting with quadratic cost (Figure 7a).
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(b) 1.0M iterations
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(h) 4.0M iterations
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Figure 15: Instability of Nash voting with unknown adversary with quadratic cost (Figure 7b).
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(a) 0.5M iterations
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(b) 1.0M iterations
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(c) 1.5M iterations
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(d) 2.0M iterations
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Figure 16: Instability of iterated Nash voting in the double trolley problem with quadratic cost.
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(a) 0.5M iterations
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(b) 1.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(c) 1.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(d) 2.0M iterations
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(h) 4.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(i) 4.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(j) 5.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(k) 5.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(l) 6.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(m) 6.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(n) 7.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(o) 7.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(p) 8.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(q) 8.5M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
(r) 9.0M iterations
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Credence in deontology
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Nu
m
be
r o
n 
tra
ck
s (
X)
Nothing
Push
Lie Only
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Figure 17: Instability of Nash voting with quadratic cost in the guard trolley problem (Fig-
ure 7c).
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